Happy New Year! After the slew of general elections in Canada in 2011, this year will be relatively quiet at home: it is likely that only Alberta and Nunavut will head to the polls.
However, internationally, 2012 will be a big electoral year, specifically in presidential countries. The 19 largest economies of the world (by purchasing power parity) are divided as follows:
- 5 monarchies: Japan, UK, Spain, Canada, Australia
- 4 with presidents that are not popularly elected: China, India, Germany, Italy
- 1 with a president that is not the head of state: Iran
- 9 with head-of-state presidents that are popularly elected: US, Russia, Brazil, France, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Taiwan
Fully 7 of the 9 countries in the last category will have a presidential election in 2012. This is a very rare occurrence: if these 9 countries' presidential election schedules remain unchanged (either by law or events), this only happens once every 60 years. Here's a brief rundown of these seven elections:
- January: Taiwan. Like every presidential election in this country, this one will have a profound impact on China-Taiwan relations, which may deteriorate if the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-Wen beats the incumbent Ma Ying-Jeou. This race is very tight. 4-year term. Legislative elections, where the ruling party is expected to hold on, will be held concurrently.
- March: Russia. Vladimir Putin will probably win, but it will be interesting to see the extent of the vote rigging, the reaction to it, and whether Putin needs a second round. 6-year term (for the first time). Legislative elections were held in December 2011, spawning mass protests over irregularities and claims that Putin's United Russia would not have won a majority in a fair vote.
- April/May: France. Socialist François Hollande will probably defeat incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy and take over the presidency. There is an outside chance that Sarkozy does so poorly that far-right candidate Marine Le Pen makes it to the second round. 5-year term. Legislative elections to follow the presidential election.
- July: Mexico. The incumbent cannot run since presidents here are limited to a single 6-year term. Legislative elections will be held concurrently.
- August: Turkey. This will be the first popular election for President, who is mainly a figurehead. 5-year term. Legislative elections were held last year.
- November: United States. You all know what this is about. 4-year term. Legislative elections will be held concurrently.
- December: South Korea. The ruling Conservatives are much more hawkish toward North Korea than the Centrist/Liberal opposition. The Conservative incumbent cannot run since presidents here are limited to a single 5-year term. Legislative elections will also be held this year, in April.
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
Sunday, October 30, 2011
Bill C-20: Representation
Well, moving back to Canada, settling down, and starting a new job have taken their toll, but given my past posts (see here and here) on this issue, I wanted to say a few words about Bill C-20.
My comments will refer to the following five redistribution schemes, all of which ensure that no province loses seats relative to the 1988/1993 elections:
1. Current law: divide 279 seats proportionally among the 10 provinces, and then make sure no province loses seats.
2. My proposal: make the size of the House such that Québec is proportionally represented with 75 seats. Divide the remaining seats proportionally among provinces other than Québec. Then make sure no province loses seats, and divide the remaining seats proportionally among the remaining provinces. Iterate until no province loses seats.
3. Second* Tory proposal: Québec gets 75 seats, and every province gets seats in proportion. Then make sure no province loses seats.
4. Third Tory proposal: each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient, but no province loses seats. The electoral quotient is 108,000, and then increases with the 10-province population growth.
5. Current Tory proposal (C-20): each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient. The electoral quotient is 111,166, and then increases with average of the population growth in each of the 10 provinces. Then make sure no province loses seats. Then add seats to Québec such that it is not underrepresented relative to its share of the 10-province population.
The first 4 schemes use raw census counts. C-20, however, uses population estimates based on census counts. The advantage is that this corrects for some people not counted by the census. The disadvantage is that figuring out how many people the census missed is somewhat arbitrary, so whoever comes up with those estimates (Statistics Canada bureaucrats, perhaps under pressure by the government) has the power to influence the number of seats.
*If you remember, the first Tory proposal sought to disadvantage Ontario with respect to Alberta and BC due to Ontario being a "large" province. Obviously, that went nowhere.
Short-run comparisons (what happens after the next redistribution)
- All of the following are estimates, based on current population estimates for July 1, 2011 (which haven't yet incorporated 2011 census data), and on the 2006 census' estimated undercounts.
- Under all proposals, provinces and territories other than BC, AB, ON and QC keep their current seat count, for a combined 63 seats.
- Under C-20, relative to current law, the House expands by 25 extra seats. Over half of that gain (13) goes to Ontario, with 5 accruing to BC, 4 to AB and 3 to QC.
- Under C-20, Alberta could very possibly end up with 35 seats, while BC and ON may well end up with just 41 and 120 seats respectively - this will depend on how the census plays out.
- Under C-20, relative to the previous Tory proposal, Québec obviously gains, but not all other provinces lose. Indeed, the change is roughly neutral for Ontario and Alberta, at least if census undercoverage remains similar as in 2006: it was around 4% in ON and AB, but just 3% in Canada as a whole. Thus, using population estimates rather than census counts gives Ontario 1-2 extra seats, and pushes Alberta closer to that 35th seat. This roughly compensates for the slightly larger size of the House.
- C-20 is a little worse than my proposal for Québec even though both seek to make its seat share equal to its population share. The reason is that census undercoverage tends to be lower in Québec - just 1-2% in 2006 - so using raw census data would give Québec a higher share than using population estimates. This is, of course, just a measurement issue, and in principle, C-20 treats Québec in the same way as my plan, so I view it as fair. Props to the government on that.
- Overall, I'm ambivalent towards the main difference between C-20 and my plan: the size of the House. On the one hand, C-20 makes it quite a bit bigger, with all the associated expenses. On the other hand, given that the 6 small provinces' seat numbers are fixed, the only way to reduce their overrepresentation is to have more MPs. I think I'd be willing to swallow the pill if future growth in the House size were controlled under C-20. Is it the case?
Long-Run Comparisons
All five plans have the following common-sense feature: the size of the House doesn't change if all provinces grow at the same rate. But this condition is far from holding in Canada! In each plan, the House grows if historical trends continue.
1. Current law: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the 10-province population growth rate. 6-7 seats in the past two redistributions, and would probably have been 5-7 this time.
2. My proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between the national population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. This difference has shrunk dramatically recently: just 0.1-0.2% per year in the past three years. That translates into a 3-to-7-seat increase in the size of the House per decade. In the late 90s, the gap was instead 0.5-0.6% per year, which would mean a 16-to-20-seat increase per decade.
3. Second Tory proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. Since this difference would only affect BC, AB and ON's seats, the House would grow roughly as fast as under my proposal. (The fact that BC, AB and ON's seat shares are slightly below their population shares should be roughly canceled by the fact that the smaller provinces grow, on average, a bit slower than Québec.)
4. Third Tory proposal: essentially the same as current law.
5. Bill C-20: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the average of the population growth rates of the 10 provinces. The latter is likely to be significantly lower than the 10-province population growth rate because smaller provinces send to grow slower. As a result, the House would grow more quickly under Bill C-20 than under current law or the previous Tory plan. This discrepancy was only about 0.1% in the past three years because of healthy growth rates in SK, MB and PEI, but it was 0.4% as recently as in 2007, and 0.5% from 1991 to 2001. Since BC, AB and ON would have about 60% of seats, Bill C-20 is likely to increase the House size 0.7-3% per decade more quickly than current law. This would mean a total increase of 7 to 18 seats per decade, about the same as under plans 2 and 3 above.
What we see is that Bill C-20 combines the largest immediate seat increase and the largest House growth rate of the 5 plans. It's an expensive way to correct representational inequities, necessitated by the six small provinces being unwilling to recognize the logical consequence of their reduced population weight...
My comments will refer to the following five redistribution schemes, all of which ensure that no province loses seats relative to the 1988/1993 elections:
1. Current law: divide 279 seats proportionally among the 10 provinces, and then make sure no province loses seats.
2. My proposal: make the size of the House such that Québec is proportionally represented with 75 seats. Divide the remaining seats proportionally among provinces other than Québec. Then make sure no province loses seats, and divide the remaining seats proportionally among the remaining provinces. Iterate until no province loses seats.
3. Second* Tory proposal: Québec gets 75 seats, and every province gets seats in proportion. Then make sure no province loses seats.
4. Third Tory proposal: each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient, but no province loses seats. The electoral quotient is 108,000, and then increases with the 10-province population growth.
5. Current Tory proposal (C-20): each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient. The electoral quotient is 111,166, and then increases with average of the population growth in each of the 10 provinces. Then make sure no province loses seats. Then add seats to Québec such that it is not underrepresented relative to its share of the 10-province population.
The first 4 schemes use raw census counts. C-20, however, uses population estimates based on census counts. The advantage is that this corrects for some people not counted by the census. The disadvantage is that figuring out how many people the census missed is somewhat arbitrary, so whoever comes up with those estimates (Statistics Canada bureaucrats, perhaps under pressure by the government) has the power to influence the number of seats.
*If you remember, the first Tory proposal sought to disadvantage Ontario with respect to Alberta and BC due to Ontario being a "large" province. Obviously, that went nowhere.
Short-run comparisons (what happens after the next redistribution)
- All of the following are estimates, based on current population estimates for July 1, 2011 (which haven't yet incorporated 2011 census data), and on the 2006 census' estimated undercounts.
- Under all proposals, provinces and territories other than BC, AB, ON and QC keep their current seat count, for a combined 63 seats.
| BC | AB | ON | QC | Total | |
| Current law | 37 | 30 | 108 | 75 | 313 |
| My proposal | 38 | 31 | 111 | 75 | 318 |
| Second Tory | 42 | 35 | 122 | 75 | 337 |
| Third Tory | 42 | 34 | 119 | 75 | 333 |
| Bill C-20 | 42 | 34 | 121 | 78 | 338 |
- Under C-20, relative to current law, the House expands by 25 extra seats. Over half of that gain (13) goes to Ontario, with 5 accruing to BC, 4 to AB and 3 to QC.
- Under C-20, Alberta could very possibly end up with 35 seats, while BC and ON may well end up with just 41 and 120 seats respectively - this will depend on how the census plays out.
- Under C-20, relative to the previous Tory proposal, Québec obviously gains, but not all other provinces lose. Indeed, the change is roughly neutral for Ontario and Alberta, at least if census undercoverage remains similar as in 2006: it was around 4% in ON and AB, but just 3% in Canada as a whole. Thus, using population estimates rather than census counts gives Ontario 1-2 extra seats, and pushes Alberta closer to that 35th seat. This roughly compensates for the slightly larger size of the House.
- C-20 is a little worse than my proposal for Québec even though both seek to make its seat share equal to its population share. The reason is that census undercoverage tends to be lower in Québec - just 1-2% in 2006 - so using raw census data would give Québec a higher share than using population estimates. This is, of course, just a measurement issue, and in principle, C-20 treats Québec in the same way as my plan, so I view it as fair. Props to the government on that.
- Overall, I'm ambivalent towards the main difference between C-20 and my plan: the size of the House. On the one hand, C-20 makes it quite a bit bigger, with all the associated expenses. On the other hand, given that the 6 small provinces' seat numbers are fixed, the only way to reduce their overrepresentation is to have more MPs. I think I'd be willing to swallow the pill if future growth in the House size were controlled under C-20. Is it the case?
Long-Run Comparisons
All five plans have the following common-sense feature: the size of the House doesn't change if all provinces grow at the same rate. But this condition is far from holding in Canada! In each plan, the House grows if historical trends continue.
1. Current law: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the 10-province population growth rate. 6-7 seats in the past two redistributions, and would probably have been 5-7 this time.
2. My proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between the national population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. This difference has shrunk dramatically recently: just 0.1-0.2% per year in the past three years. That translates into a 3-to-7-seat increase in the size of the House per decade. In the late 90s, the gap was instead 0.5-0.6% per year, which would mean a 16-to-20-seat increase per decade.
3. Second Tory proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. Since this difference would only affect BC, AB and ON's seats, the House would grow roughly as fast as under my proposal. (The fact that BC, AB and ON's seat shares are slightly below their population shares should be roughly canceled by the fact that the smaller provinces grow, on average, a bit slower than Québec.)
4. Third Tory proposal: essentially the same as current law.
5. Bill C-20: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the average of the population growth rates of the 10 provinces. The latter is likely to be significantly lower than the 10-province population growth rate because smaller provinces send to grow slower. As a result, the House would grow more quickly under Bill C-20 than under current law or the previous Tory plan. This discrepancy was only about 0.1% in the past three years because of healthy growth rates in SK, MB and PEI, but it was 0.4% as recently as in 2007, and 0.5% from 1991 to 2001. Since BC, AB and ON would have about 60% of seats, Bill C-20 is likely to increase the House size 0.7-3% per decade more quickly than current law. This would mean a total increase of 7 to 18 seats per decade, about the same as under plans 2 and 3 above.
What we see is that Bill C-20 combines the largest immediate seat increase and the largest House growth rate of the 5 plans. It's an expensive way to correct representational inequities, necessitated by the six small provinces being unwilling to recognize the logical consequence of their reduced population weight...
Monday, August 22, 2011
R.I.P. Jack
My thoughts are with his family. Coping with the loss of any family member is difficult. But from recent experience, I can attest that when the decedent is a public figure, there are even more things to arrange and take care of.
A sidenote: the CPC is now the only party in the Commons with a permanent leader and more than one MP.
A sidenote: the CPC is now the only party in the Commons with a permanent leader and more than one MP.
Monday, July 25, 2011
Layton Has Second Cancer, Takes Break
Layton suggests that Hull--Aylmer MP Nycole Turmel be interim leader of the NDP.
Good luck, Jack.
Good luck, Jack.
Thursday, June 23, 2011
PQ In-Fighting Opens Door to Legault
A Québec provincial poll suggests that the centre-right party proposed by François Legault has 40% support against 26% for the Liberals, 17% for the PQ and 8% for the ADQ. Just like for the NDP, such a result would give Mr. Legault a commanding majority.
Of course, as Legault gets more scrutiny, his support may wane, though that didn't happen with the NDP. Still, these results imply that 74% of the Québec electorate is ready to vote for a right-of-centre party. This is consistent with the analysis that Québec's NDP vote on May 2 was for change rather than for a left-wing agenda.
Even without Legault's new party, the PQ would lose by 6% to the Liberals (29-35). It goes without saying that the recent crisis has greatly damaged Marois' party.
Note: Sorry for the lack of posting in the past month - three major life events that normally only occur every few years and lots of traveling have taken their toll. Posting will likely remain limited for the next three months, but hopefully there won't be any more whole-month gaps.
Of course, as Legault gets more scrutiny, his support may wane, though that didn't happen with the NDP. Still, these results imply that 74% of the Québec electorate is ready to vote for a right-of-centre party. This is consistent with the analysis that Québec's NDP vote on May 2 was for change rather than for a left-wing agenda.
Even without Legault's new party, the PQ would lose by 6% to the Liberals (29-35). It goes without saying that the recent crisis has greatly damaged Marois' party.
Note: Sorry for the lack of posting in the past month - three major life events that normally only occur every few years and lots of traveling have taken their toll. Posting will likely remain limited for the next three months, but hopefully there won't be any more whole-month gaps.
Monday, May 23, 2011
Election Results Are Official
The election results from every riding have been validated, and the four recounts have been completed. As previously noted, the validation process moved one Québec riding from the Tories to the NDP. None of the recounts produced a further change in the winner.
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Economy, Economy, Economy
For any government, the state of the economy is of paramount importance. But it is even more so for the Harper government over the next four years. After all, it is its perceived competence in that matter that drove Torontonians to give it a majority.
The Conservative economic and fiscal platform was basically: we'll make sure the recovery continues; this will eliminate most of the deficit, and we'll make some not-too-painful cuts to eliminate the rest.
Whether the recovery continues or not is, alas, largely outside the incoming government's control. Obviously, Canada has little impact on international factors such as the U.S. recovery. But even on the domestic front, most of the story has already been determined, and we're just waiting to see how things play out.
Indeed, on macroeconomic issues, a government's performance often depends more on the previous government's actions than on its own. For example, Mulroney's poor showing had much to do with Trudeau's economic mismanagement, while foundations of the Liberal success in the 90s were laid by the Tories with the GST and FTA. Similarly, the continued success of the Canadian economy under Harper was mostly a product of Chrétien and Martin's sound policies and Canadians' sacrifices in the 90s.
In many ways, over the next four years, we will find out how good the Tories' management of the economy has been over the past five years. We will have a better sense of whether:
- the government's stimulus plan succeeded in producing a sustainable recovery;
- the Tories spent outside the country's means prior to the recession;
- there is a housing bubble which the Tories should have tried to prevent.
How these issues play out will have a direct impact on Canadians' well-being and on the government's agenda. If there is no housing bubble, the recovery is sustained, and past spending increases were reasonable, then the Conservatives can deliver on their plan to balance the budget with moderate cuts that most Canadians won't notice. However, if we find out that there is a housing bubble (through it bursting), if the recovery runs out of steam, or if the spending growth of the good times was excessive, then the government will have to introduce unpopular measures, show up to the 2015 election with a deficit, or both.
Barring major events in Québec or a major scandal, the Conservatives' fate in the 2015 election may have already been largely determined.
The same cannot be said of the Liberals and the NDP. Obviously, if the economy does well, they have little chance of winning power in 2015. But the NDP can durably squeeze out the Grits if they manage to establish economic credibility over the next four years. Conversely, if the NDP fails to do so, then the Grits could regain the position of government-in-waiting if they get their act together. Of course, since the election, both parties' performances have ranged from disappointing to laughable...
The Conservative economic and fiscal platform was basically: we'll make sure the recovery continues; this will eliminate most of the deficit, and we'll make some not-too-painful cuts to eliminate the rest.
Whether the recovery continues or not is, alas, largely outside the incoming government's control. Obviously, Canada has little impact on international factors such as the U.S. recovery. But even on the domestic front, most of the story has already been determined, and we're just waiting to see how things play out.
Indeed, on macroeconomic issues, a government's performance often depends more on the previous government's actions than on its own. For example, Mulroney's poor showing had much to do with Trudeau's economic mismanagement, while foundations of the Liberal success in the 90s were laid by the Tories with the GST and FTA. Similarly, the continued success of the Canadian economy under Harper was mostly a product of Chrétien and Martin's sound policies and Canadians' sacrifices in the 90s.
In many ways, over the next four years, we will find out how good the Tories' management of the economy has been over the past five years. We will have a better sense of whether:
- the government's stimulus plan succeeded in producing a sustainable recovery;
- the Tories spent outside the country's means prior to the recession;
- there is a housing bubble which the Tories should have tried to prevent.
How these issues play out will have a direct impact on Canadians' well-being and on the government's agenda. If there is no housing bubble, the recovery is sustained, and past spending increases were reasonable, then the Conservatives can deliver on their plan to balance the budget with moderate cuts that most Canadians won't notice. However, if we find out that there is a housing bubble (through it bursting), if the recovery runs out of steam, or if the spending growth of the good times was excessive, then the government will have to introduce unpopular measures, show up to the 2015 election with a deficit, or both.
Barring major events in Québec or a major scandal, the Conservatives' fate in the 2015 election may have already been largely determined.
The same cannot be said of the Liberals and the NDP. Obviously, if the economy does well, they have little chance of winning power in 2015. But the NDP can durably squeeze out the Grits if they manage to establish economic credibility over the next four years. Conversely, if the NDP fails to do so, then the Grits could regain the position of government-in-waiting if they get their act together. Of course, since the election, both parties' performances have ranged from disappointing to laughable...
Sunday, May 15, 2011
Districts of Different Sizes: Who Benefits?
It is well-known that the size of electoral districts (whether measured by population, electorate, or votes) varies wildly, not only across provinces, but also within provinces. When we put everything together, which party benefited from these discrepancies in 2011?
One measure of this would be to compare a party's actual voting share to what I'll call its effective voting share, defined as the average of that party's share of votes in each riding.
For example, suppose that a country has two electoral districts, with 40 votes in district A, and 60 votes in the district B. A party gets 50% of the vote in A, and 30% in B. Clearly, that party is favoured because it's doing well in a less populated district. Its actual national vote share is 38% (38 votes out of 100), but because the districts have equal weight, the party's effective voting share is 40% (average of 50% and 30%).
For each of the major parties, below is its effective voting share, with its actual voting share in parentheses:
CON: 39.7% (39.6%)
LIB: 19.3% (18.9%)
NDP: 30.8% (30.6%)
BQ: 5.6% (6.0%)
GRN: 3.7% (3.9%)
CON: 39.9% (39.8%) in 307 ridings with candidates
BQ: 23.2% (23.4%) in Québec
GRN: 3.8% (4.0%) in 304 ridings with candidates
We immediately notice that all three main parties modestly benefit from some votes being more important than others. This may be slightly surprising in the case of the Tories, whose support is concentrated in underrepresented BC, Ontario and Alberta. However, this is more than countered by Conservative support being concentrated in rural ridings, which tend to be less populated, and by Albertans voting less than other Canadians.
The Bloc and the Greens, on the other hand, are hurt. The Bloc is disadvantaged mainly because Québec votes are worth less than the average vote elsewhere due to a larger number of electors per district, while the Greens' support is concentrated in underrepresented BC.
The lesson I take from this exercise is that this distortion is rather minimal: no party's effective voice is changed by more than 0.4% (1 seat if we had a proportional system). So while the variation of district sizes may be unfair to certain constituencies, it does not significantly affect party representation in the Commons.
One measure of this would be to compare a party's actual voting share to what I'll call its effective voting share, defined as the average of that party's share of votes in each riding.
For example, suppose that a country has two electoral districts, with 40 votes in district A, and 60 votes in the district B. A party gets 50% of the vote in A, and 30% in B. Clearly, that party is favoured because it's doing well in a less populated district. Its actual national vote share is 38% (38 votes out of 100), but because the districts have equal weight, the party's effective voting share is 40% (average of 50% and 30%).
For each of the major parties, below is its effective voting share, with its actual voting share in parentheses:
CON: 39.7% (39.6%)
LIB: 19.3% (18.9%)
NDP: 30.8% (30.6%)
BQ: 5.6% (6.0%)
GRN: 3.7% (3.9%)
CON: 39.9% (39.8%) in 307 ridings with candidates
BQ: 23.2% (23.4%) in Québec
GRN: 3.8% (4.0%) in 304 ridings with candidates
We immediately notice that all three main parties modestly benefit from some votes being more important than others. This may be slightly surprising in the case of the Tories, whose support is concentrated in underrepresented BC, Ontario and Alberta. However, this is more than countered by Conservative support being concentrated in rural ridings, which tend to be less populated, and by Albertans voting less than other Canadians.
The Bloc and the Greens, on the other hand, are hurt. The Bloc is disadvantaged mainly because Québec votes are worth less than the average vote elsewhere due to a larger number of electors per district, while the Greens' support is concentrated in underrepresented BC.
The lesson I take from this exercise is that this distortion is rather minimal: no party's effective voice is changed by more than 0.4% (1 seat if we had a proportional system). So while the variation of district sizes may be unfair to certain constituencies, it does not significantly affect party representation in the Commons.
Saturday, May 14, 2011
Safe Seats
Safest Seat in Each Province
NL - St. John's East (NDP by 50.3%)
PE - Egmont (CON by 23.3%)
NS - Central Nova (CON by 32%)
NB - Acadie--Bathurst (NDP by 53.5%)
QC - Gatineau (NDP by 46.7%)
ON - Wellington--Halton Hills (CON by 47.3%)
MB - Portage--Lisgar (CON by 66.2%)
SK - Souris--Moose Mountain (CON by 55.3%)
AB - Crowfoot (CON by 74.8%)
BC - Abbotsford (CON by 44.8%)
North - Nunavut (CON by 21.2%)
It's quite striking that the safest seat in Québec is a turnover. Also, the safest seat in Nova Scotia was projected incorrectly (though I'm in good company): MacKay was far from safe in 2006, and of course it was hard to say what to make of 2008 with May as a candidate.
Seats Won by over 50%
Outside Alberta
66.2% - Portage--Lisgar, MB (CON)
55.3% - Souris--Moose Mountain, SK (CON)
53.5% - Acadie--Bathurst, NB (NDP)
52.7% - Provencher, MB (CON)
50.3% - St. John's East, NL (NDP)
In Alberta (obviously all Conservative)
74.8% - Crowfoot
70.0% - Wetaskiwin
68.5% - Vegreville--Wainwright
67.1% - Macleod
66.0% - Calgary Southeast
65.7% - Westlock--St. Paul
64.0% - Yellowhead
63.5% - Wild Rose
63.2% - Calgary Southwest
60.8% - Red Deer
59.6% - Peace River
58.6% - Fort McMurray--Athabasca
58.5% - Medicine Hat
57.7% - Calgary--Nose Hill
55.3% - Edmonton--Spruce Grove
53.3% - Calgary East
The only riding outside of Edmonton or Calgary that was decided by less than 58.4% was Lethbridge, where Conservative Jim Hillyer won by 29.3% (he still carried 56.5% of the vote). This is the mystery candidate known for going to the bathroom when cornered by a reporter.
The median margin of victory in Alberta was 56.5%...
Addendum: The largest margin of victory for a Liberal was 31.9% in Humber--St. Barbe--Baie Verte; outside of Newfoundland, it was 19.1% in York West. The largest Bloc margin was 10.5% in Haute-Gaspésie--La Mitis--Matane--Matapédia (new MP), less than Elizabeth May's 10.7% cushion in Saanich--Gulf Islands.
Just under half the ridings went by over 20%: 106 to Tories, 41 to Dippers and 2 to Liberals.
NL - St. John's East (NDP by 50.3%)
PE - Egmont (CON by 23.3%)
NS - Central Nova (CON by 32%)
NB - Acadie--Bathurst (NDP by 53.5%)
QC - Gatineau (NDP by 46.7%)
ON - Wellington--Halton Hills (CON by 47.3%)
MB - Portage--Lisgar (CON by 66.2%)
SK - Souris--Moose Mountain (CON by 55.3%)
AB - Crowfoot (CON by 74.8%)
BC - Abbotsford (CON by 44.8%)
North - Nunavut (CON by 21.2%)
It's quite striking that the safest seat in Québec is a turnover. Also, the safest seat in Nova Scotia was projected incorrectly (though I'm in good company): MacKay was far from safe in 2006, and of course it was hard to say what to make of 2008 with May as a candidate.
Seats Won by over 50%
Outside Alberta
66.2% - Portage--Lisgar, MB (CON)
55.3% - Souris--Moose Mountain, SK (CON)
53.5% - Acadie--Bathurst, NB (NDP)
52.7% - Provencher, MB (CON)
50.3% - St. John's East, NL (NDP)
In Alberta (obviously all Conservative)
74.8% - Crowfoot
70.0% - Wetaskiwin
68.5% - Vegreville--Wainwright
67.1% - Macleod
66.0% - Calgary Southeast
65.7% - Westlock--St. Paul
64.0% - Yellowhead
63.5% - Wild Rose
63.2% - Calgary Southwest
60.8% - Red Deer
59.6% - Peace River
58.6% - Fort McMurray--Athabasca
58.5% - Medicine Hat
57.7% - Calgary--Nose Hill
55.3% - Edmonton--Spruce Grove
53.3% - Calgary East
The only riding outside of Edmonton or Calgary that was decided by less than 58.4% was Lethbridge, where Conservative Jim Hillyer won by 29.3% (he still carried 56.5% of the vote). This is the mystery candidate known for going to the bathroom when cornered by a reporter.
The median margin of victory in Alberta was 56.5%...
Addendum: The largest margin of victory for a Liberal was 31.9% in Humber--St. Barbe--Baie Verte; outside of Newfoundland, it was 19.1% in York West. The largest Bloc margin was 10.5% in Haute-Gaspésie--La Mitis--Matane--Matapédia (new MP), less than Elizabeth May's 10.7% cushion in Saanich--Gulf Islands.
Just under half the ridings went by over 20%: 106 to Tories, 41 to Dippers and 2 to Liberals.
Ontario and Toronto
Despite a larger swing away from the Liberals in the Toronto area, the region remains much friendlier to the Grits than the rest of Ontario, which is a complete Liberal wasteland. Below are some telling stats comparing the 39 ridings entirely within the Toronto CMA to the 67 other Ontario districts.
Seats won
Toronto CMA: 24 C, 8 N, 7 L
Elsewhere: 49 C, 14 N, 4 L
Came in first of second
Toronto CMA: 36 L, 31 C, 11 N
Elsewhere: 66 C, 45 N, 21 L, 1 G, 1 I
[Aside: Without looking up election results, can you guess the only Ontarian riding outside Toronto CMA where the Conservative candidate failed to make the top two?]
Won, or within 15% of winner
Toronto CMA: 31 C, 29 L, 13 N
Elsewhere: 56 C, 19 N, 10 L
Clearly, even though the Liberals won fewer seats than the New Democrats in the Toronto area, they were still the Tories' main opponents. In fact, in every single one of those 39 ridings, a Liberal won, was second, or was within 15% of the winner. (The comparable figures were 31 for the Conservatives and 14 for the NDP.)
Indeed, within the Toronto area, the Liberals caught lots of bad breaks. Looking at the number of wins and the number of losses by less than 10%:
CON: 16-4
NDP: 2-3
LIB: 3-18
[Incidentally, yes, 21 of 39 races within the Toronto CMA were decided by less than 10%. The same statistic was 12/32 for the Atlantic, 21/75 for Québec, 9/67 elsewhere in Ontario, and 18/95 in the West and North. Thus, despite having less than 13% of the ridings, Toronto accounted for almost 26% of the close races nationwide.]
Elsewhere in Ontario, however, the Grits were almost completely out of it. The only ten ridings where a Liberal won or came within 15% were:
- Guelph
- Kingston and the Islands
- Kitchener Centre
- Kitchener--Waterloo
- London North Centre
- Nipissing--Timiskaming
- Ottawa--Orléans
- Ottawa South
- Ottawa--Vanier
- Ottawa West--Nepean
All of these are mainly urban, except for Nipissing-Timiskaming.
Seats won
Toronto CMA: 24 C, 8 N, 7 L
Elsewhere: 49 C, 14 N, 4 L
Came in first of second
Toronto CMA: 36 L, 31 C, 11 N
Elsewhere: 66 C, 45 N, 21 L, 1 G, 1 I
[Aside: Without looking up election results, can you guess the only Ontarian riding outside Toronto CMA where the Conservative candidate failed to make the top two?]
Won, or within 15% of winner
Toronto CMA: 31 C, 29 L, 13 N
Elsewhere: 56 C, 19 N, 10 L
Clearly, even though the Liberals won fewer seats than the New Democrats in the Toronto area, they were still the Tories' main opponents. In fact, in every single one of those 39 ridings, a Liberal won, was second, or was within 15% of the winner. (The comparable figures were 31 for the Conservatives and 14 for the NDP.)
Indeed, within the Toronto area, the Liberals caught lots of bad breaks. Looking at the number of wins and the number of losses by less than 10%:
CON: 16-4
NDP: 2-3
LIB: 3-18
[Incidentally, yes, 21 of 39 races within the Toronto CMA were decided by less than 10%. The same statistic was 12/32 for the Atlantic, 21/75 for Québec, 9/67 elsewhere in Ontario, and 18/95 in the West and North. Thus, despite having less than 13% of the ridings, Toronto accounted for almost 26% of the close races nationwide.]
Elsewhere in Ontario, however, the Grits were almost completely out of it. The only ten ridings where a Liberal won or came within 15% were:
- Guelph
- Kingston and the Islands
- Kitchener Centre
- Kitchener--Waterloo
- London North Centre
- Nipissing--Timiskaming
- Ottawa--Orléans
- Ottawa South
- Ottawa--Vanier
- Ottawa West--Nepean
All of these are mainly urban, except for Nipissing-Timiskaming.
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