The PQ just issued a statement: all "Québec citizens" will have the right to run, including non-francophones automatically granted Québec citizenship, i.e. Canadian citizens living in
Québec when the law comes into force and their descendants. I still disagree with the project, but at least anyone that currently
has the right to run would keep it.
Of course, this begs the question: Was
Marois hopelessly confused? Or was the PQ actually floating a trial
balloon to see how people would react to denying fundamental democratic
rights to a minority? Either way, not reassuring...
Seat projections by a British Columbian and former Quebecer. Occasional random observations and opinions.
Latest national poll median date: October 20
Projections reflect recent polling graciously made publicly available by pollsters and media organizations. I am not a pollster, and derive no income from this blog.
Projections reflect recent polling graciously made publicly available by pollsters and media organizations. I am not a pollster, and derive no income from this blog.
If you are new to this blog, please read this post containing important information for interpreting the projections.
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
Too Far
Well, this is going too far. The PQ is tightening the criteria for its proposed Québec citizenship. The highlights:
There would be three types of Canadian citizens in Québec:
1. Non-Québec citizens
2. Québec citizens that don't speak French
3. Québec citizens that speak French
Only Québec citizens can:
- Contribute to a provincial, municipal or school board campaign
- Present a petition to the National Assembly
Only Québec citizens that speak French can:
- Be a candidate at a provincial, municipal or school board election
There are three ways of acquiring Québec citizenship:
1. Be a Canadian citizen living in Québec when the law comes into effect
2. Be born to a Québec citizen
3. Apply and satisfy all three of the following:
a) Have lived in Québec as a Canadian citizen for the three months preceding the application
b) Have lived in Québec for a total of six months
c) Have an appropriate knowledge of French and the rights and duties of Québec citizens
So, in particular:
- First Nations Quebecers that do not speak French would be barred from running in a municipal election. (Talk about newcomers respecting natives' heritage!)
- The same goes for Anglophones in the West Island.
- Canadians from elsewhere moving to Québec would be barred from donating to a provincial political party if they do not speak French.
This is almost certainly unconstitutional, and would likely violate clauses in the Constitution that the Notwithstanding Clause cannot override. Still, this shows the PQ's willingness to go much farther than it has ever gone in terms of the French language.
Update: The PQ is going back to its original, less controversial proposal. See this post.
There would be three types of Canadian citizens in Québec:
1. Non-Québec citizens
2. Québec citizens that don't speak French
3. Québec citizens that speak French
Only Québec citizens can:
- Contribute to a provincial, municipal or school board campaign
- Present a petition to the National Assembly
Only Québec citizens that speak French can:
- Be a candidate at a provincial, municipal or school board election
There are three ways of acquiring Québec citizenship:
1. Be a Canadian citizen living in Québec when the law comes into effect
2. Be born to a Québec citizen
3. Apply and satisfy all three of the following:
a) Have lived in Québec as a Canadian citizen for the three months preceding the application
b) Have lived in Québec for a total of six months
c) Have an appropriate knowledge of French and the rights and duties of Québec citizens
So, in particular:
- First Nations Quebecers that do not speak French would be barred from running in a municipal election. (Talk about newcomers respecting natives' heritage!)
- The same goes for Anglophones in the West Island.
- Canadians from elsewhere moving to Québec would be barred from donating to a provincial political party if they do not speak French.
This is almost certainly unconstitutional, and would likely violate clauses in the Constitution that the Notwithstanding Clause cannot override. Still, this shows the PQ's willingness to go much farther than it has ever gone in terms of the French language.
Update: The PQ is going back to its original, less controversial proposal. See this post.
Québec's Parties: A Primer and My Thoughts
As you know, an election campaign is ongoing in my former province of Québec. I am just following this campaign as a "normal" citizen, and not making seat projections. Here are some thoughts on the parties and their positions. I will likely do another post later on this campaign's electoral dynamics, which are fascinating.
- Liberal Party of Québec: A very tired government that has been plagued with ethics issues. The Liberals' strategy is threefold:
1. present themselves as the party of the economy;
2. show that the other main parties are as dirty as they are;
3. convince voters that they are the only reliably federalist option.
On point 1, I have to agree that the Liberals' platform is probably the best (or rather, the least bad) for Québec's economy. However, their fiscal plan is dishonest: they say that they are going to pay for their promises, which, once they're enacted, will cost over $1.2 billion/year, with the budget's $300 million/year contingency reserves. By their "logic," the contingency reserves total $1.5 billion, which covers the new spending... On point 2, it was somewhat surprising that during the debates, the other leaders were not able to score points on the corruption issues, which does suggest that the other leaders have skeletons in their closets. However, as the party that has been in power for the past 9 years, the Liberals will be held mainly responsible for the situation. Finally, Jean Charest is mocking CAQ leader François Legault's recent conversion to being a federalist, and says that he might switch back. This makes sense: as things stand, both the Liberals and the CAQ are federalist and centre-right, so Charest needs to create separation between the parties, or many dissatisfied Liberals will decide to go for the new thing.
- Parti Québécois: A team with many star candidates that fully expects to be Québec's next government. The main pillars of the PQ's strategy:
1. be THE party of the French language and Québec identity;
2. stay vague on whether a referendum will be held;
3. have a vague economic platform.
Just about the only major clear thing in the PQ's platform is that it will extend "Bill" 101 to colleges (grades 12 and 13) and to firms employing 11 to 50 employees. This project would have a destructive impact on Montreal's non-francophone communities, from English-speaking colleges who would lose much of their enrollment to Chinese restaurants that will have to shrink or close unless their staff learns French. Also, the PQ wants to adopt a secular charter that would more or less prohibit displays of religious symbols in public institutions and by their staffs - but it would make an exception for the cross in the National Assembly because it's part of Québec's heritage. At the same time, the PQ wants to remove from the National Assembly symbols of the monarchy, which, of course, are also part of Québec's heritage... Having grown up in Québec, I can say that most PQ supporters are not racist: they genuinely bear no ill will towards minorities, and just want to protect their language and their culture. However, the PQ has taken this very (too?) far this time around, and it is more probably more ethno-centric that it has been in a generation, or maybe ever. "All of us are Quebecers, but some more than others" seems to be the message.
The PQ is staying vague on everything else because it is ahead in the polls. It needs both the vote of the hardcore separatists (who now have other options like Québec Solidaire and Option Nationale) and of the separatists who don't want a referendum now (who might be tempted to vote for the CAQ). It is also a big tent party economically, and is being squeezed on the left by QS and ON and on the right by the CAQ. In keeping with its centre-left orientation, the PQ has a few lefty goodies in store, but they are relatively minor.
- Coalition Avenir Québec: This is a new party that can have a broad appeal. It is neither the Liberals nor the PQ, at a time many Quebecers want change. It is federalist (for now), but more nationalist than the Liberals. It has right-wing roots from swallowing the ADQ, but its actual platform is rather centrist, if with a populist/reformist bent (e.g. save on administrative costs by getting rid of school boards and regional health authorities).
The CAQ's main weakness is the quality of its team. Its leader François Legault is well-known and relatively well-respected (at least by today's standards for a politician). His lieutenant Jacques Duchesnau is an outspoken critic of corruption, but prone to making exaggerated statements, and hasn't always worked well with others. Gaétan Barrette, the prospective Health minister, is a controversial figure. Apart from these three and former ADQ leader Gérard Deltell (who is rather well-liked, but not that well-known), Quebecers don't know much about CAQ candidates. This is especially a problem due to the CAQ's proposals for systemic reforms: such measures tend to have unintended consequences, and Quebecers are worried that the CAQ team might end up making one big mess.
- Québec Solidaire: A left-wing and idealistic party - a separatist version of what the federal NDP used to be before becoming a major contender. One of QS's two spokespersons (the party does not have a "leader") was elected in 2008. To achieve sovereignty in the right way, it wants to create a citizen's assembly to write a prospective constitution and launch a vast consultation and social debate leading up to a referendum (as opposed to the PQ's quick 30-day referendum campaign). It is likely the biggest "clean" party, and the most likeable party in Québec. However, when you look at their economic platform, you wonder if they live in an alternative universe where all jobs are either in the public sector or created with public subsidies. QS has a shot in a few eastern Montreal ridings, and may be a spoiler for the PQ elsewhere.
- Option Nationale: A one-man show in the crowded left-wing separatist space (more hardcore separatist than both PQ and QS, between the two economically). The man in question, Jean-Martin Aussant, was elected under the PQ banner in 2008, but became disgruntled with Pauline Marois' leadership. ON will only be a factor in Aussant's own riding.
No other party, including the Greens, is likely to win a seat.
- Liberal Party of Québec: A very tired government that has been plagued with ethics issues. The Liberals' strategy is threefold:
1. present themselves as the party of the economy;
2. show that the other main parties are as dirty as they are;
3. convince voters that they are the only reliably federalist option.
On point 1, I have to agree that the Liberals' platform is probably the best (or rather, the least bad) for Québec's economy. However, their fiscal plan is dishonest: they say that they are going to pay for their promises, which, once they're enacted, will cost over $1.2 billion/year, with the budget's $300 million/year contingency reserves. By their "logic," the contingency reserves total $1.5 billion, which covers the new spending... On point 2, it was somewhat surprising that during the debates, the other leaders were not able to score points on the corruption issues, which does suggest that the other leaders have skeletons in their closets. However, as the party that has been in power for the past 9 years, the Liberals will be held mainly responsible for the situation. Finally, Jean Charest is mocking CAQ leader François Legault's recent conversion to being a federalist, and says that he might switch back. This makes sense: as things stand, both the Liberals and the CAQ are federalist and centre-right, so Charest needs to create separation between the parties, or many dissatisfied Liberals will decide to go for the new thing.
- Parti Québécois: A team with many star candidates that fully expects to be Québec's next government. The main pillars of the PQ's strategy:
1. be THE party of the French language and Québec identity;
2. stay vague on whether a referendum will be held;
3. have a vague economic platform.
Just about the only major clear thing in the PQ's platform is that it will extend "Bill" 101 to colleges (grades 12 and 13) and to firms employing 11 to 50 employees. This project would have a destructive impact on Montreal's non-francophone communities, from English-speaking colleges who would lose much of their enrollment to Chinese restaurants that will have to shrink or close unless their staff learns French. Also, the PQ wants to adopt a secular charter that would more or less prohibit displays of religious symbols in public institutions and by their staffs - but it would make an exception for the cross in the National Assembly because it's part of Québec's heritage. At the same time, the PQ wants to remove from the National Assembly symbols of the monarchy, which, of course, are also part of Québec's heritage... Having grown up in Québec, I can say that most PQ supporters are not racist: they genuinely bear no ill will towards minorities, and just want to protect their language and their culture. However, the PQ has taken this very (too?) far this time around, and it is more probably more ethno-centric that it has been in a generation, or maybe ever. "All of us are Quebecers, but some more than others" seems to be the message.
The PQ is staying vague on everything else because it is ahead in the polls. It needs both the vote of the hardcore separatists (who now have other options like Québec Solidaire and Option Nationale) and of the separatists who don't want a referendum now (who might be tempted to vote for the CAQ). It is also a big tent party economically, and is being squeezed on the left by QS and ON and on the right by the CAQ. In keeping with its centre-left orientation, the PQ has a few lefty goodies in store, but they are relatively minor.
- Coalition Avenir Québec: This is a new party that can have a broad appeal. It is neither the Liberals nor the PQ, at a time many Quebecers want change. It is federalist (for now), but more nationalist than the Liberals. It has right-wing roots from swallowing the ADQ, but its actual platform is rather centrist, if with a populist/reformist bent (e.g. save on administrative costs by getting rid of school boards and regional health authorities).
The CAQ's main weakness is the quality of its team. Its leader François Legault is well-known and relatively well-respected (at least by today's standards for a politician). His lieutenant Jacques Duchesnau is an outspoken critic of corruption, but prone to making exaggerated statements, and hasn't always worked well with others. Gaétan Barrette, the prospective Health minister, is a controversial figure. Apart from these three and former ADQ leader Gérard Deltell (who is rather well-liked, but not that well-known), Quebecers don't know much about CAQ candidates. This is especially a problem due to the CAQ's proposals for systemic reforms: such measures tend to have unintended consequences, and Quebecers are worried that the CAQ team might end up making one big mess.
- Québec Solidaire: A left-wing and idealistic party - a separatist version of what the federal NDP used to be before becoming a major contender. One of QS's two spokespersons (the party does not have a "leader") was elected in 2008. To achieve sovereignty in the right way, it wants to create a citizen's assembly to write a prospective constitution and launch a vast consultation and social debate leading up to a referendum (as opposed to the PQ's quick 30-day referendum campaign). It is likely the biggest "clean" party, and the most likeable party in Québec. However, when you look at their economic platform, you wonder if they live in an alternative universe where all jobs are either in the public sector or created with public subsidies. QS has a shot in a few eastern Montreal ridings, and may be a spoiler for the PQ elsewhere.
- Option Nationale: A one-man show in the crowded left-wing separatist space (more hardcore separatist than both PQ and QS, between the two economically). The man in question, Jean-Martin Aussant, was elected under the PQ banner in 2008, but became disgruntled with Pauline Marois' leadership. ON will only be a factor in Aussant's own riding.
No other party, including the Greens, is likely to win a seat.
Monday, August 13, 2012
Why So Few Gold Medals?
Canada's low gold medal count in London - one - is raising eyebrows: it is lower than our "usual" total of three (achieved in every summer Games after 1984, except in London and in Barcelona, where seven were won). However, even three is low compared to how much silver and bronze our athletes bring home. Indeed, gold accounted no more than a third of Canada's medals in every postwar summer games except Barcelona! This Vancouver Sun blog post has more stats.
As it turns out, this can be explained by simple math and the following two facts:
- Canada does not have a very large population; and
- Canada is competitive in many sports.
To see this, consider the following situation: a sport has 5 elite athletes, two from China, two from the US, and one from Canada. For simplicity, we will assume there there's no luck involved at the Olympics - the final results perfectly reflect the quality of athletes.
What happens if every athlete receives the same quality of support and training, so that everyone has an equal opportunity? Our Canadian then has an equal chance of being in each position from 1st through 5th - 20% chance of gold, 20% chance of silver and 20% chance of bronze.
But now suppose that the sporting federation imposes a rule: each country can only enter one athlete. To win gold, our Canadian athlete would still need to be the best. But she can win silver either by being second, or by being third if the top two athletes are from the same country. And of course, she is now guaranteed at least a bronze. Simply by virtue of being a smaller country, Canada now has a 20% chance of gold, ~27% chance of silver and ~53% chance of bronze!
In other words, having limited entries hurts large countries chances of winning bronze much more than it hurts their chances of winning gold: they still get to send their best athlete(s), but might not get to send all of their medal contenders. Thus, small countries will tend to win disproportionately many bronze medals.
Of course, even though Canada isn't the US or China, we're still larger than most countries. But the same effect applies: suppose a sport has 100 elite athletes, with 50 from the US, two from Canada, and one each from 48 other countries, so that Canada is actually the second largest country out of 50. Again, assume that each country has one entry. Canada's chances of winning gold are 2%. We don't necessarily win silver if one of our athletes is second: we won't send her to the games if the other one is first. But it is very unlikely that the two Canadian athletes happen to be the top two in the world (~0.02% chance). It is much more likely that the top Canadian, even if she is third, still ends up with a silver because the top two are American (~0.50%). She could even rank worse and still get silver if all of the superior athletes are American. The probability of winning silver turns out to be about 2.97%, and the probability of winning bronze, roughly 3.92%. So if there were 100 such events, you would expect Canada to win roughly two gold, three silver and four bronze. Thus, limited entries help even relatively large countries like Canada, as long as some other country/countries are much larger. Canada is a significant player in diving, but think about what would happen to Canadian medal hopes in diving if all countries including China were allowed to send all medal contenders.
By the way, this also explains why, even excluding Vancouver, Canada has no gold medal problems in the winter: we are a relatively large winter sports nation. (We don't actually dominate any winter sport except for hockey and curling, which yield few medals - this is why you also wouldn't expect a disproportionate amount of gold. But we are a significant presence in all the ice sports, freestyle skiing and snowboarding, where we win most of our medals.)
What about small countries like New Zealand that rack up the gold medals? As it turns out, these countries focus on a small number of sports. New Zealand might have a smaller population than BC, but it has lots of rowers focusing on small boats (i.e. not Eights) and sailors. At these Olympics, we also saw North Korea and Kazakhstan focus on weightlifting, which brought results. On the other hand, Spain, whose talent is also spread out (outside male soccer and basketball, which don't give many medals), has the same problems as Canada: apart from Barcelona and two pre-WWII games where it only won one medal, Spain's gold medal count has never even reached one third of its total haul. In summary, what matters is a country's "effective size" within each sport. So small countries can earn a disproportionate amount of gold if they focus on certain sports. Canada, by contrast, is spread quite thin.
Does this mean that Canada should start focusing on few sports? No: spreading out makes our gold count low relative to our total medal count because it enhances our total medal count by allowing us to be a "small" country benefiting from the limited entries effect. (To be sure, there are other arguments, such as economies of scale, for focusing on a small number of disciplines - especially cheap ones like weightlifting.) Also, being competitive at a large number of sports may be more effective in encouraging athletic activity, which is the larger goal of participating in the Olympics.
By the same token, this analysis only explains why we have few summer gold medals relative to silver and bronze. It does not explain why our total count is high or low, though as I hypothesized in my previous post, our total count is probably right around where it should be.
That said, the single gold performance at these Olympics is very poor: just 0.3% of total gold medals, while we account for 0.5% of the global population and are comparatively very well off. Even accounting for the mathematical effect described here, you'd expect more than one gold out of 18 medals. Of course, throw in luck, and such a thing will happen once in a while - so let's hope that this is just a one-off.
As it turns out, this can be explained by simple math and the following two facts:
- Canada does not have a very large population; and
- Canada is competitive in many sports.
To see this, consider the following situation: a sport has 5 elite athletes, two from China, two from the US, and one from Canada. For simplicity, we will assume there there's no luck involved at the Olympics - the final results perfectly reflect the quality of athletes.
What happens if every athlete receives the same quality of support and training, so that everyone has an equal opportunity? Our Canadian then has an equal chance of being in each position from 1st through 5th - 20% chance of gold, 20% chance of silver and 20% chance of bronze.
But now suppose that the sporting federation imposes a rule: each country can only enter one athlete. To win gold, our Canadian athlete would still need to be the best. But she can win silver either by being second, or by being third if the top two athletes are from the same country. And of course, she is now guaranteed at least a bronze. Simply by virtue of being a smaller country, Canada now has a 20% chance of gold, ~27% chance of silver and ~53% chance of bronze!
In other words, having limited entries hurts large countries chances of winning bronze much more than it hurts their chances of winning gold: they still get to send their best athlete(s), but might not get to send all of their medal contenders. Thus, small countries will tend to win disproportionately many bronze medals.
Of course, even though Canada isn't the US or China, we're still larger than most countries. But the same effect applies: suppose a sport has 100 elite athletes, with 50 from the US, two from Canada, and one each from 48 other countries, so that Canada is actually the second largest country out of 50. Again, assume that each country has one entry. Canada's chances of winning gold are 2%. We don't necessarily win silver if one of our athletes is second: we won't send her to the games if the other one is first. But it is very unlikely that the two Canadian athletes happen to be the top two in the world (~0.02% chance). It is much more likely that the top Canadian, even if she is third, still ends up with a silver because the top two are American (~0.50%). She could even rank worse and still get silver if all of the superior athletes are American. The probability of winning silver turns out to be about 2.97%, and the probability of winning bronze, roughly 3.92%. So if there were 100 such events, you would expect Canada to win roughly two gold, three silver and four bronze. Thus, limited entries help even relatively large countries like Canada, as long as some other country/countries are much larger. Canada is a significant player in diving, but think about what would happen to Canadian medal hopes in diving if all countries including China were allowed to send all medal contenders.
By the way, this also explains why, even excluding Vancouver, Canada has no gold medal problems in the winter: we are a relatively large winter sports nation. (We don't actually dominate any winter sport except for hockey and curling, which yield few medals - this is why you also wouldn't expect a disproportionate amount of gold. But we are a significant presence in all the ice sports, freestyle skiing and snowboarding, where we win most of our medals.)
What about small countries like New Zealand that rack up the gold medals? As it turns out, these countries focus on a small number of sports. New Zealand might have a smaller population than BC, but it has lots of rowers focusing on small boats (i.e. not Eights) and sailors. At these Olympics, we also saw North Korea and Kazakhstan focus on weightlifting, which brought results. On the other hand, Spain, whose talent is also spread out (outside male soccer and basketball, which don't give many medals), has the same problems as Canada: apart from Barcelona and two pre-WWII games where it only won one medal, Spain's gold medal count has never even reached one third of its total haul. In summary, what matters is a country's "effective size" within each sport. So small countries can earn a disproportionate amount of gold if they focus on certain sports. Canada, by contrast, is spread quite thin.
Does this mean that Canada should start focusing on few sports? No: spreading out makes our gold count low relative to our total medal count because it enhances our total medal count by allowing us to be a "small" country benefiting from the limited entries effect. (To be sure, there are other arguments, such as economies of scale, for focusing on a small number of disciplines - especially cheap ones like weightlifting.) Also, being competitive at a large number of sports may be more effective in encouraging athletic activity, which is the larger goal of participating in the Olympics.
By the same token, this analysis only explains why we have few summer gold medals relative to silver and bronze. It does not explain why our total count is high or low, though as I hypothesized in my previous post, our total count is probably right around where it should be.
That said, the single gold performance at these Olympics is very poor: just 0.3% of total gold medals, while we account for 0.5% of the global population and are comparatively very well off. Even accounting for the mathematical effect described here, you'd expect more than one gold out of 18 medals. Of course, throw in luck, and such a thing will happen once in a while - so let's hope that this is just a one-off.
Sunday, August 12, 2012
Canadian Medal Count: Not Bad
Every summer Olympics, some Canadians despair at our low medal count: not only do all more populous developed countries (except for Spain, who can console itself with its soccer team) beat us hands down, but Australia, with just 2/3 of our population, does so too. Certainly, the COC's objective of a Top 12 finish at summer games has once again been missed - Canada was 13th by total medals, two shy of the Netherlands and Ukraine. However, the obvious explanation for this is that much of our athletic talent is involved with winter sports, so one should take the winter Olympics into account before despairing.
(We should also note that with 18 medals, Canada ties its best performance at summer games conducted outside the US, albeit with less gold than in Barcelona or Beijing.)
Are summer and winter medals comparable? I think so. While fewer countries contest winter sports, there are also many fewer medals available at the winter Olympics: just 86 events in Vancouver versus 302 in London. The ratio is probably roughly right.
Here's a list of countries with at least 10 medals total from Vancouver and London (ties are broken by the number of gold, then silver) [updated to account for the doping incident in women's shot put]:
1. USA 141
2. CHN 99
3. RUS 97
4. GER 74
5. GBR 66
6. FRA 45
9. KOR 42
10. AUS 38
11. ITA 33
12. NED 28
13. NOR 27
14. UKR 20 (all summer)
15. SWE 19
16. HUN 17 (all summer)
17. ESP 17 (all summer)
18. BRA 17 (all summer)
19. CZE 16
20. AUT 16 (all winter!)
21. POL 16
22. BLR 15
23. KAZ 14
24. CUB 14 (all summer)
25. SUI 13
26. NZL 13 (all summer)
27. IRI 12 (all summer)
28. JAM 12 (all summer)
29. KEN 11 (all summer)
30. AZE 10 (all summer)
As you can see, Canada, in fact, does quite well, drawing level with much more populous countries like Japan and France, and handily beating Italy and Spain. And this is not a host country effect: Canada won only two more medals in Vancouver than in Turin. (Britain, however, increased its medal count by 18 between Beijing and London.) The only countries that are well ahead of Canada are the US, China, Russia, Germany and Britain. The first four all have more than twice Canada's population, while Britain is over 80% more populous and would likely have a much smaller lead had it not been the host country this year.
We also notice that there's a clear Top 13: the G8 countries, China, Korea, Australia, the Netherlands and Norway, who is 118th by population... (If only it produced as high quality soccer referees as athletes!)
One might be tempted to look at population per medal in order to establish a "fair" comparison. However, this ignores the fact that the number of entries into the competition is far from proportional to population: in most team sports, only one entry per country is allowed, and even in most individual sports, the limit is one, two or three. As a result, you just can't expect the US to win 9 times as many medals as Canada.
Then of course, there's the issue of each country's resources. Obviously, given similar populations, rich countries will have a much easier time than poor ones. Witness hapless India, with just 6 medals despite having more than 1/6 of the world's population. Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh, the world's 6th, 7th and 8th most populous countries with over 150 million people each, have no medals at all!
A better way of looking at this data might be to plot the number of medals against total GDP. You wouldn't be looking for a straight line, but rather a concave curve, due to the lack of proportionality of competitive entries to population. And what to put on the GDP axis is not clear. First, it should likely be some mix of GDP at market prices and GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP, which adjusts for differing price levels between countries): a top-level athlete's consumption basket has a significant international component, so going by PPP alone would be misleading. Second, it should exclude "subsistence" GDP - something between the $1.25/day = $457/year/person poverty line used by the UN and $1,000/year/person, which is roughly the number for Afghanistan, the poorest country to win a medal in London (both figures PPP). Somebody should do this - looking at the various news outlets, many people have been paid for doing much less...
If we look only at rich countries, though, plotting medals against population works pretty well, since almost everyone's GDP PPP per capita is between $25,000 and $50,000. (It's still true that you'd want to fit a concave curve rather than a line.) Now, I'm feeling lazy, but just looking at the numbers, Norway and Australia would, unsurprisingly, be the big overachievers, while Japan, Italy and Spain would be the worst underachievers. Canada would likely lie above the fitted curve.
In terms of gold, however, the story might be different for Canada. Of course, in this cycle, thanks to the gold explosion in Vancouver, Canada has 15 gold medals out of 44. But usually, gold accounts for much less than one third of Canadian medals (3 in the summer and 7 in the winter is normal).
So, given the concentration of Canadian athletic resources in winter sports, our athletes' performance at the London games is right about what you'd expect - a bit better in terms of total medals, though a bit worse in terms of gold.
(We should also note that with 18 medals, Canada ties its best performance at summer games conducted outside the US, albeit with less gold than in Barcelona or Beijing.)
Are summer and winter medals comparable? I think so. While fewer countries contest winter sports, there are also many fewer medals available at the winter Olympics: just 86 events in Vancouver versus 302 in London. The ratio is probably roughly right.
Here's a list of countries with at least 10 medals total from Vancouver and London (ties are broken by the number of gold, then silver) [updated to account for the doping incident in women's shot put]:
1. USA 141
2. CHN 99
3. RUS 97
4. GER 74
5. GBR 66
6. FRA 45
7. CAN 44
8. JPN 439. KOR 42
10. AUS 38
11. ITA 33
12. NED 28
13. NOR 27
14. UKR 20 (all summer)
15. SWE 19
16. HUN 17 (all summer)
17. ESP 17 (all summer)
18. BRA 17 (all summer)
19. CZE 16
20. AUT 16 (all winter!)
21. POL 16
22. BLR 15
23. KAZ 14
24. CUB 14 (all summer)
25. SUI 13
26. NZL 13 (all summer)
27. IRI 12 (all summer)
28. JAM 12 (all summer)
29. KEN 11 (all summer)
30. AZE 10 (all summer)
As you can see, Canada, in fact, does quite well, drawing level with much more populous countries like Japan and France, and handily beating Italy and Spain. And this is not a host country effect: Canada won only two more medals in Vancouver than in Turin. (Britain, however, increased its medal count by 18 between Beijing and London.) The only countries that are well ahead of Canada are the US, China, Russia, Germany and Britain. The first four all have more than twice Canada's population, while Britain is over 80% more populous and would likely have a much smaller lead had it not been the host country this year.
We also notice that there's a clear Top 13: the G8 countries, China, Korea, Australia, the Netherlands and Norway, who is 118th by population... (If only it produced as high quality soccer referees as athletes!)
One might be tempted to look at population per medal in order to establish a "fair" comparison. However, this ignores the fact that the number of entries into the competition is far from proportional to population: in most team sports, only one entry per country is allowed, and even in most individual sports, the limit is one, two or three. As a result, you just can't expect the US to win 9 times as many medals as Canada.
Then of course, there's the issue of each country's resources. Obviously, given similar populations, rich countries will have a much easier time than poor ones. Witness hapless India, with just 6 medals despite having more than 1/6 of the world's population. Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh, the world's 6th, 7th and 8th most populous countries with over 150 million people each, have no medals at all!
A better way of looking at this data might be to plot the number of medals against total GDP. You wouldn't be looking for a straight line, but rather a concave curve, due to the lack of proportionality of competitive entries to population. And what to put on the GDP axis is not clear. First, it should likely be some mix of GDP at market prices and GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP, which adjusts for differing price levels between countries): a top-level athlete's consumption basket has a significant international component, so going by PPP alone would be misleading. Second, it should exclude "subsistence" GDP - something between the $1.25/day = $457/year/person poverty line used by the UN and $1,000/year/person, which is roughly the number for Afghanistan, the poorest country to win a medal in London (both figures PPP). Somebody should do this - looking at the various news outlets, many people have been paid for doing much less...
If we look only at rich countries, though, plotting medals against population works pretty well, since almost everyone's GDP PPP per capita is between $25,000 and $50,000. (It's still true that you'd want to fit a concave curve rather than a line.) Now, I'm feeling lazy, but just looking at the numbers, Norway and Australia would, unsurprisingly, be the big overachievers, while Japan, Italy and Spain would be the worst underachievers. Canada would likely lie above the fitted curve.
In terms of gold, however, the story might be different for Canada. Of course, in this cycle, thanks to the gold explosion in Vancouver, Canada has 15 gold medals out of 44. But usually, gold accounts for much less than one third of Canadian medals (3 in the summer and 7 in the winter is normal).
So, given the concentration of Canadian athletic resources in winter sports, our athletes' performance at the London games is right about what you'd expect - a bit better in terms of total medals, though a bit worse in terms of gold.
Wednesday, July 11, 2012
1%... Of What?
The Occupy movement may not be as active as it was last fall, but the theme of inequality features prominently in the U.S. Presidential Election. It has often been asserted in the media that the top 1% (in the U.S.) are those with incomes above around $350,000. However, income is probably not the right measure here: while for most of the population, purchasing power is mainly dictated by income - most people don't have much savings outside their home and their retirement account - for the rich, wealth matters much more. Unfortunately, statistics on wealth are much harder to come by than statistics on income since wealth is not directly taxed in North America.
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) by the Federal Reserve is probably the best source of information about the wealth of Americans. It is conducted every three years, and the latest survey was done in 2010, with its data released last month. 6,492 families were interviewed; because means are very sensitive to the financial situation of the richest families, these were oversampled and weighed accordingly.
(By the way, there is a Canadian version of the SCF called the Survey of Financial Security (SFS). It is not conducted regularly; the most recent SFS was in 2005, and the previous one was in 1999. Given that the current government does not value data, we might have a long time to wait before the next SFS.)
You can read the Fed's summary of the results here. We learn, for example, that the median family net worth in the U.S. was $77,300. For financial assets alone, which excludes real estate, vehicles, business equity, but also all liabilities, the median (among the 94% of families that have any financial assets) was just $21,500. This includes not just one's bank accounts and CDs, but also retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.
So what about the top 1%? This hasn't been widely reported since the Fed's writeup doesn't include the information, but since the SCF's data is (mostly) publicly available, I decided to take a look. It turns out that the threshold to be in the top 1% of U.S. families by net worth is about $6.82 million. (The average family has 2.7 people, so that would be about $2.5 million per person.)
If you're curious, here are thresholds for other levels:
Top 50% - $77,300, as mentioned above
Top 25% - $301,700 (can be found in Fed's report)
Top 10% - $952,500 (ditto)
Top 5% - $1.86 million (ditto)
Top 4% - $2.20 million
Top 3% - $2.85 million
Top 2% - $4.28 million
Top 1% - $6.82 million
Top 0.5% - $11.2 million
Top 0.2% - $19 million
Top 0.1% - $27 million
At the other end of the spectrum, about 11% of families have negative net worth, and another 2% have zero net worth.
Now, the above data is for all families. A family with $7 million that includes a couple, three kids and two grandparents would certainly be rich, but few would call it better off than a 30-year-old bachelor with $5 million. So rather than a single threshold of $6.82 million for labeling a household "1%," it would be more appropriate to have different thresholds for different types of families. Here are some examples (all in millions of dollars):
- Singles age 25-30 (my group!): 0.43
- Couples with 2 kids, head age 40-45: 6.6
- All couples (with or without kids), head age 60-65: 13.5
(If you're curious, the medians for these groups are, respectively, $13,000, $130,000 and $310,000.)
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) by the Federal Reserve is probably the best source of information about the wealth of Americans. It is conducted every three years, and the latest survey was done in 2010, with its data released last month. 6,492 families were interviewed; because means are very sensitive to the financial situation of the richest families, these were oversampled and weighed accordingly.
(By the way, there is a Canadian version of the SCF called the Survey of Financial Security (SFS). It is not conducted regularly; the most recent SFS was in 2005, and the previous one was in 1999. Given that the current government does not value data, we might have a long time to wait before the next SFS.)
You can read the Fed's summary of the results here. We learn, for example, that the median family net worth in the U.S. was $77,300. For financial assets alone, which excludes real estate, vehicles, business equity, but also all liabilities, the median (among the 94% of families that have any financial assets) was just $21,500. This includes not just one's bank accounts and CDs, but also retirement accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.
So what about the top 1%? This hasn't been widely reported since the Fed's writeup doesn't include the information, but since the SCF's data is (mostly) publicly available, I decided to take a look. It turns out that the threshold to be in the top 1% of U.S. families by net worth is about $6.82 million. (The average family has 2.7 people, so that would be about $2.5 million per person.)
If you're curious, here are thresholds for other levels:
Top 50% - $77,300, as mentioned above
Top 25% - $301,700 (can be found in Fed's report)
Top 10% - $952,500 (ditto)
Top 5% - $1.86 million (ditto)
Top 4% - $2.20 million
Top 3% - $2.85 million
Top 2% - $4.28 million
Top 1% - $6.82 million
Top 0.5% - $11.2 million
Top 0.2% - $19 million
Top 0.1% - $27 million
At the other end of the spectrum, about 11% of families have negative net worth, and another 2% have zero net worth.
Now, the above data is for all families. A family with $7 million that includes a couple, three kids and two grandparents would certainly be rich, but few would call it better off than a 30-year-old bachelor with $5 million. So rather than a single threshold of $6.82 million for labeling a household "1%," it would be more appropriate to have different thresholds for different types of families. Here are some examples (all in millions of dollars):
- Singles age 25-30 (my group!): 0.43
- Couples with 2 kids, head age 40-45: 6.6
- All couples (with or without kids), head age 60-65: 13.5
(If you're curious, the medians for these groups are, respectively, $13,000, $130,000 and $310,000.)
Tuesday, March 13, 2012
Did Robocalls Depress Voter Turnout?
Yes, according to this study by SFU Economics professor Anke Kessler, which finds that polling stations with lower Conservative vote shares experienced a larger decrease in voter turnout in robocall ridings than in non-robocall ridings. The study compares polling stations within ridings (rather than simply comparing ridings with and without robocalls). This gets around the problem that robocall ridings were tighter and thus likely to have higher turnout, which would mask the actual effect of robocalls.
Specifically, the study finds that, in non-robocall ridings, a polling station with 10% more opposition support would experience a 0.46% relative decrease in turnout - this is just the result of the left having a bad night and the right having a good night. However, in robocall ridings, a polling station with 10% more opposition support would instead experience a 0.97% relative decrease in turnout. (All '%' denote percentage points.)
In other words, relative to Conservative turnout, non-Conservative turnout decreased by 4.6% in non-robocall ridings, but 9.7% in robocall ridings. The net effect of robocalls is thus measured to be 5.1%. The study notes that the average riding had about 82,000 registered voters and roughly 60% opposition support, so, in an average riding, the results suggest that a robocall campaign would depress opposition turnout by 2,500 votes, over and beyond what it would have been.
Even fully believing in this result (and ignoring that ridings have different sizes and opposition support levels), however, does not imply that the winner would have been different in all robocall ridings where the Conservative margin of victory was below 2,500 votes: the decrease in turnout is spread among all the opposition parties, and not just the one that finished second.
On the other hand, this study looks specifically at the effect of robocalls on turnout. It ignores the fact that people might have still shown up to the polls, but voted for a different party due to robocalls. Thus, the true impact of robocalls could have been significantly larger.
Specifically, the study finds that, in non-robocall ridings, a polling station with 10% more opposition support would experience a 0.46% relative decrease in turnout - this is just the result of the left having a bad night and the right having a good night. However, in robocall ridings, a polling station with 10% more opposition support would instead experience a 0.97% relative decrease in turnout. (All '%' denote percentage points.)
In other words, relative to Conservative turnout, non-Conservative turnout decreased by 4.6% in non-robocall ridings, but 9.7% in robocall ridings. The net effect of robocalls is thus measured to be 5.1%. The study notes that the average riding had about 82,000 registered voters and roughly 60% opposition support, so, in an average riding, the results suggest that a robocall campaign would depress opposition turnout by 2,500 votes, over and beyond what it would have been.
Even fully believing in this result (and ignoring that ridings have different sizes and opposition support levels), however, does not imply that the winner would have been different in all robocall ridings where the Conservative margin of victory was below 2,500 votes: the decrease in turnout is spread among all the opposition parties, and not just the one that finished second.
On the other hand, this study looks specifically at the effect of robocalls on turnout. It ignores the fact that people might have still shown up to the polls, but voted for a different party due to robocalls. Thus, the true impact of robocalls could have been significantly larger.
Labels:
Canadian Politics,
Economics,
Election 2011
Tuesday, January 3, 2012
2012: The Year of Presidential Elections
Happy New Year! After the slew of general elections in Canada in 2011, this year will be relatively quiet at home: it is likely that only Alberta and Nunavut will head to the polls.
However, internationally, 2012 will be a big electoral year, specifically in presidential countries. The 19 largest economies of the world (by purchasing power parity) are divided as follows:
- 5 monarchies: Japan, UK, Spain, Canada, Australia
- 4 with presidents that are not popularly elected: China, India, Germany, Italy
- 1 with a president that is not the head of state: Iran
- 9 with head-of-state presidents that are popularly elected: US, Russia, Brazil, France, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Taiwan
Fully 7 of the 9 countries in the last category will have a presidential election in 2012. This is a very rare occurrence: if these 9 countries' presidential election schedules remain unchanged (either by law or events), this only happens once every 60 years. Here's a brief rundown of these seven elections:
- January: Taiwan. Like every presidential election in this country, this one will have a profound impact on China-Taiwan relations, which may deteriorate if the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-Wen beats the incumbent Ma Ying-Jeou. This race is very tight. 4-year term. Legislative elections, where the ruling party is expected to hold on, will be held concurrently.
- March: Russia. Vladimir Putin will probably win, but it will be interesting to see the extent of the vote rigging, the reaction to it, and whether Putin needs a second round. 6-year term (for the first time). Legislative elections were held in December 2011, spawning mass protests over irregularities and claims that Putin's United Russia would not have won a majority in a fair vote.
- April/May: France. Socialist François Hollande will probably defeat incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy and take over the presidency. There is an outside chance that Sarkozy does so poorly that far-right candidate Marine Le Pen makes it to the second round. 5-year term. Legislative elections to follow the presidential election.
- July: Mexico. The incumbent cannot run since presidents here are limited to a single 6-year term. Legislative elections will be held concurrently.
- August: Turkey. This will be the first popular election for President, who is mainly a figurehead. 5-year term. Legislative elections were held last year.
- November: United States. You all know what this is about. 4-year term. Legislative elections will be held concurrently.
- December: South Korea. The ruling Conservatives are much more hawkish toward North Korea than the Centrist/Liberal opposition. The Conservative incumbent cannot run since presidents here are limited to a single 5-year term. Legislative elections will also be held this year, in April.
However, internationally, 2012 will be a big electoral year, specifically in presidential countries. The 19 largest economies of the world (by purchasing power parity) are divided as follows:
- 5 monarchies: Japan, UK, Spain, Canada, Australia
- 4 with presidents that are not popularly elected: China, India, Germany, Italy
- 1 with a president that is not the head of state: Iran
- 9 with head-of-state presidents that are popularly elected: US, Russia, Brazil, France, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey, Taiwan
Fully 7 of the 9 countries in the last category will have a presidential election in 2012. This is a very rare occurrence: if these 9 countries' presidential election schedules remain unchanged (either by law or events), this only happens once every 60 years. Here's a brief rundown of these seven elections:
- January: Taiwan. Like every presidential election in this country, this one will have a profound impact on China-Taiwan relations, which may deteriorate if the pro-independence candidate Tsai Ing-Wen beats the incumbent Ma Ying-Jeou. This race is very tight. 4-year term. Legislative elections, where the ruling party is expected to hold on, will be held concurrently.
- March: Russia. Vladimir Putin will probably win, but it will be interesting to see the extent of the vote rigging, the reaction to it, and whether Putin needs a second round. 6-year term (for the first time). Legislative elections were held in December 2011, spawning mass protests over irregularities and claims that Putin's United Russia would not have won a majority in a fair vote.
- April/May: France. Socialist François Hollande will probably defeat incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy and take over the presidency. There is an outside chance that Sarkozy does so poorly that far-right candidate Marine Le Pen makes it to the second round. 5-year term. Legislative elections to follow the presidential election.
- July: Mexico. The incumbent cannot run since presidents here are limited to a single 6-year term. Legislative elections will be held concurrently.
- August: Turkey. This will be the first popular election for President, who is mainly a figurehead. 5-year term. Legislative elections were held last year.
- November: United States. You all know what this is about. 4-year term. Legislative elections will be held concurrently.
- December: South Korea. The ruling Conservatives are much more hawkish toward North Korea than the Centrist/Liberal opposition. The Conservative incumbent cannot run since presidents here are limited to a single 5-year term. Legislative elections will also be held this year, in April.
Sunday, October 30, 2011
Bill C-20: Representation
Well, moving back to Canada, settling down, and starting a new job have taken their toll, but given my past posts (see here and here) on this issue, I wanted to say a few words about Bill C-20.
My comments will refer to the following five redistribution schemes, all of which ensure that no province loses seats relative to the 1988/1993 elections:
1. Current law: divide 279 seats proportionally among the 10 provinces, and then make sure no province loses seats.
2. My proposal: make the size of the House such that Québec is proportionally represented with 75 seats. Divide the remaining seats proportionally among provinces other than Québec. Then make sure no province loses seats, and divide the remaining seats proportionally among the remaining provinces. Iterate until no province loses seats.
3. Second* Tory proposal: Québec gets 75 seats, and every province gets seats in proportion. Then make sure no province loses seats.
4. Third Tory proposal: each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient, but no province loses seats. The electoral quotient is 108,000, and then increases with the 10-province population growth.
5. Current Tory proposal (C-20): each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient. The electoral quotient is 111,166, and then increases with average of the population growth in each of the 10 provinces. Then make sure no province loses seats. Then add seats to Québec such that it is not underrepresented relative to its share of the 10-province population.
The first 4 schemes use raw census counts. C-20, however, uses population estimates based on census counts. The advantage is that this corrects for some people not counted by the census. The disadvantage is that figuring out how many people the census missed is somewhat arbitrary, so whoever comes up with those estimates (Statistics Canada bureaucrats, perhaps under pressure by the government) has the power to influence the number of seats.
*If you remember, the first Tory proposal sought to disadvantage Ontario with respect to Alberta and BC due to Ontario being a "large" province. Obviously, that went nowhere.
Short-run comparisons (what happens after the next redistribution)
- All of the following are estimates, based on current population estimates for July 1, 2011 (which haven't yet incorporated 2011 census data), and on the 2006 census' estimated undercounts.
- Under all proposals, provinces and territories other than BC, AB, ON and QC keep their current seat count, for a combined 63 seats.
- Under C-20, relative to current law, the House expands by 25 extra seats. Over half of that gain (13) goes to Ontario, with 5 accruing to BC, 4 to AB and 3 to QC.
- Under C-20, Alberta could very possibly end up with 35 seats, while BC and ON may well end up with just 41 and 120 seats respectively - this will depend on how the census plays out.
- Under C-20, relative to the previous Tory proposal, Québec obviously gains, but not all other provinces lose. Indeed, the change is roughly neutral for Ontario and Alberta, at least if census undercoverage remains similar as in 2006: it was around 4% in ON and AB, but just 3% in Canada as a whole. Thus, using population estimates rather than census counts gives Ontario 1-2 extra seats, and pushes Alberta closer to that 35th seat. This roughly compensates for the slightly larger size of the House.
- C-20 is a little worse than my proposal for Québec even though both seek to make its seat share equal to its population share. The reason is that census undercoverage tends to be lower in Québec - just 1-2% in 2006 - so using raw census data would give Québec a higher share than using population estimates. This is, of course, just a measurement issue, and in principle, C-20 treats Québec in the same way as my plan, so I view it as fair. Props to the government on that.
- Overall, I'm ambivalent towards the main difference between C-20 and my plan: the size of the House. On the one hand, C-20 makes it quite a bit bigger, with all the associated expenses. On the other hand, given that the 6 small provinces' seat numbers are fixed, the only way to reduce their overrepresentation is to have more MPs. I think I'd be willing to swallow the pill if future growth in the House size were controlled under C-20. Is it the case?
Long-Run Comparisons
All five plans have the following common-sense feature: the size of the House doesn't change if all provinces grow at the same rate. But this condition is far from holding in Canada! In each plan, the House grows if historical trends continue.
1. Current law: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the 10-province population growth rate. 6-7 seats in the past two redistributions, and would probably have been 5-7 this time.
2. My proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between the national population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. This difference has shrunk dramatically recently: just 0.1-0.2% per year in the past three years. That translates into a 3-to-7-seat increase in the size of the House per decade. In the late 90s, the gap was instead 0.5-0.6% per year, which would mean a 16-to-20-seat increase per decade.
3. Second Tory proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. Since this difference would only affect BC, AB and ON's seats, the House would grow roughly as fast as under my proposal. (The fact that BC, AB and ON's seat shares are slightly below their population shares should be roughly canceled by the fact that the smaller provinces grow, on average, a bit slower than Québec.)
4. Third Tory proposal: essentially the same as current law.
5. Bill C-20: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the average of the population growth rates of the 10 provinces. The latter is likely to be significantly lower than the 10-province population growth rate because smaller provinces send to grow slower. As a result, the House would grow more quickly under Bill C-20 than under current law or the previous Tory plan. This discrepancy was only about 0.1% in the past three years because of healthy growth rates in SK, MB and PEI, but it was 0.4% as recently as in 2007, and 0.5% from 1991 to 2001. Since BC, AB and ON would have about 60% of seats, Bill C-20 is likely to increase the House size 0.7-3% per decade more quickly than current law. This would mean a total increase of 7 to 18 seats per decade, about the same as under plans 2 and 3 above.
What we see is that Bill C-20 combines the largest immediate seat increase and the largest House growth rate of the 5 plans. It's an expensive way to correct representational inequities, necessitated by the six small provinces being unwilling to recognize the logical consequence of their reduced population weight...
My comments will refer to the following five redistribution schemes, all of which ensure that no province loses seats relative to the 1988/1993 elections:
1. Current law: divide 279 seats proportionally among the 10 provinces, and then make sure no province loses seats.
2. My proposal: make the size of the House such that Québec is proportionally represented with 75 seats. Divide the remaining seats proportionally among provinces other than Québec. Then make sure no province loses seats, and divide the remaining seats proportionally among the remaining provinces. Iterate until no province loses seats.
3. Second* Tory proposal: Québec gets 75 seats, and every province gets seats in proportion. Then make sure no province loses seats.
4. Third Tory proposal: each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient, but no province loses seats. The electoral quotient is 108,000, and then increases with the 10-province population growth.
5. Current Tory proposal (C-20): each province's number of seats is its population divided by the electoral quotient. The electoral quotient is 111,166, and then increases with average of the population growth in each of the 10 provinces. Then make sure no province loses seats. Then add seats to Québec such that it is not underrepresented relative to its share of the 10-province population.
The first 4 schemes use raw census counts. C-20, however, uses population estimates based on census counts. The advantage is that this corrects for some people not counted by the census. The disadvantage is that figuring out how many people the census missed is somewhat arbitrary, so whoever comes up with those estimates (Statistics Canada bureaucrats, perhaps under pressure by the government) has the power to influence the number of seats.
*If you remember, the first Tory proposal sought to disadvantage Ontario with respect to Alberta and BC due to Ontario being a "large" province. Obviously, that went nowhere.
Short-run comparisons (what happens after the next redistribution)
- All of the following are estimates, based on current population estimates for July 1, 2011 (which haven't yet incorporated 2011 census data), and on the 2006 census' estimated undercounts.
- Under all proposals, provinces and territories other than BC, AB, ON and QC keep their current seat count, for a combined 63 seats.
| BC | AB | ON | QC | Total | |
| Current law | 37 | 30 | 108 | 75 | 313 |
| My proposal | 38 | 31 | 111 | 75 | 318 |
| Second Tory | 42 | 35 | 122 | 75 | 337 |
| Third Tory | 42 | 34 | 119 | 75 | 333 |
| Bill C-20 | 42 | 34 | 121 | 78 | 338 |
- Under C-20, relative to current law, the House expands by 25 extra seats. Over half of that gain (13) goes to Ontario, with 5 accruing to BC, 4 to AB and 3 to QC.
- Under C-20, Alberta could very possibly end up with 35 seats, while BC and ON may well end up with just 41 and 120 seats respectively - this will depend on how the census plays out.
- Under C-20, relative to the previous Tory proposal, Québec obviously gains, but not all other provinces lose. Indeed, the change is roughly neutral for Ontario and Alberta, at least if census undercoverage remains similar as in 2006: it was around 4% in ON and AB, but just 3% in Canada as a whole. Thus, using population estimates rather than census counts gives Ontario 1-2 extra seats, and pushes Alberta closer to that 35th seat. This roughly compensates for the slightly larger size of the House.
- C-20 is a little worse than my proposal for Québec even though both seek to make its seat share equal to its population share. The reason is that census undercoverage tends to be lower in Québec - just 1-2% in 2006 - so using raw census data would give Québec a higher share than using population estimates. This is, of course, just a measurement issue, and in principle, C-20 treats Québec in the same way as my plan, so I view it as fair. Props to the government on that.
- Overall, I'm ambivalent towards the main difference between C-20 and my plan: the size of the House. On the one hand, C-20 makes it quite a bit bigger, with all the associated expenses. On the other hand, given that the 6 small provinces' seat numbers are fixed, the only way to reduce their overrepresentation is to have more MPs. I think I'd be willing to swallow the pill if future growth in the House size were controlled under C-20. Is it the case?
Long-Run Comparisons
All five plans have the following common-sense feature: the size of the House doesn't change if all provinces grow at the same rate. But this condition is far from holding in Canada! In each plan, the House grows if historical trends continue.
1. Current law: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the 10-province population growth rate. 6-7 seats in the past two redistributions, and would probably have been 5-7 this time.
2. My proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between the national population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. This difference has shrunk dramatically recently: just 0.1-0.2% per year in the past three years. That translates into a 3-to-7-seat increase in the size of the House per decade. In the late 90s, the gap was instead 0.5-0.6% per year, which would mean a 16-to-20-seat increase per decade.
3. Second Tory proposal: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and Québec's population growth rate. Since this difference would only affect BC, AB and ON's seats, the House would grow roughly as fast as under my proposal. (The fact that BC, AB and ON's seat shares are slightly below their population shares should be roughly canceled by the fact that the smaller provinces grow, on average, a bit slower than Québec.)
4. Third Tory proposal: essentially the same as current law.
5. Bill C-20: the rate of expansion of the House depends on the difference between BC, AB and ON's population growth rate and the average of the population growth rates of the 10 provinces. The latter is likely to be significantly lower than the 10-province population growth rate because smaller provinces send to grow slower. As a result, the House would grow more quickly under Bill C-20 than under current law or the previous Tory plan. This discrepancy was only about 0.1% in the past three years because of healthy growth rates in SK, MB and PEI, but it was 0.4% as recently as in 2007, and 0.5% from 1991 to 2001. Since BC, AB and ON would have about 60% of seats, Bill C-20 is likely to increase the House size 0.7-3% per decade more quickly than current law. This would mean a total increase of 7 to 18 seats per decade, about the same as under plans 2 and 3 above.
What we see is that Bill C-20 combines the largest immediate seat increase and the largest House growth rate of the 5 plans. It's an expensive way to correct representational inequities, necessitated by the six small provinces being unwilling to recognize the logical consequence of their reduced population weight...
Monday, August 22, 2011
R.I.P. Jack
My thoughts are with his family. Coping with the loss of any family member is difficult. But from recent experience, I can attest that when the decedent is a public figure, there are even more things to arrange and take care of.
A sidenote: the CPC is now the only party in the Commons with a permanent leader and more than one MP.
A sidenote: the CPC is now the only party in the Commons with a permanent leader and more than one MP.
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